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Abstract: We examine an aspect of the argument of Teppo Felin and Nicolai Foss
(‘The Endogenous Origins of Experience, Routines, and Organizational
Capabilities: The Poverty of Stimulus’; 2011) where they reject the claim of
Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen (‘Darwinism, Causality and the Social
Sciences’; 2004) that habits depend crucially on stimuli from the social
environment. We argue that while rightly stressing human agency they also create
a false dichotomy between agential and environmental factors in the explanation.
Felin and Foss create further confusion by hinting – without adequate
clarification – at an untenable notion of human agency as an uncaused cause. We
raise several questions of clarification for these authors.
Wewelcome the stimulating contribution by Teppo Felin andNicolai Foss (2011)
to the analytical literature on routines. In this note we wish to briefly respond to
one of their arguments and raise some questions for them concerning somewhat
cryptic aspects of their stance.
We understand that Felin and Foss wish to emphasise the role of human
agency and individual psychology in the analysis of routines. In general terms
we applaud that stance. But, as elaborated elsewhere, we think that the term
‘methodological individualism’ is misleading to describe such a view (Hodgson,
2007). Any viable approach to the analysis of institutions in particular and
social phenomena in general must incorporate both individuals and structured
relations between individuals; the label of methodological individualism biases
the account in one direction only. Posing individuals versus social structure as
alternative explanantia is a false dichotomy.
Felin and Foss quote our view on habits – which we regard as basic individual
blocks for institutions and routines – where they ‘depend crucially upon stimuli
from the social environment’ (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004: 289). Felin and
Foss (2011) respond to the quoted passage: ‘Our point, on the other hand, is
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that stimuli and the environment necessarily cannot – given the poverty and
degeneracy of the stimuli – be ascribed as the causal factors of behavior and
capability’ (ibid.: 20).
This is yet another case of ambiguity and false dichotomy. Note the phrase
‘on the other hand’ depicts a dichotomy where none exists. Our position that
habits ‘depend crucially upon stimuli from the social environment’ is perfectly
consistent with Felin and Foss’s argument that they are insufficient as causes of
capabilities or behaviour. We fully accept that they are insufficient: individual
capabilities and behaviour also depend on individual personality, idiosyncrasy
and (in part) on genetic make-up. The ‘stimuli from the social environment’ are
necessary but insufficient.
Our model of habit formation that Felin and Foss (2011) take issue with
captures the accumulation of experience as an instance of sequential interaction
between environmental variables and internal states of agents. This modelling
strategy is quite common in behavioural and evolutionary approaches (March
and Simon, 1958; Nelson and Winter, 1982). The agents’ propensity to
acquire and interpret environmental feedback depends on their internal state,
but their internal state adapts in response to the feedback they seek from
the environment (including actions of other agents). As in other models of
statistical learning, repetition of a particular action improves assessment of the
mapping between action and consequence.1 In contrast, Felin and Foss (2011)
portray the agents’ experiences as instances of environmental stimuli. Their
characterization of experience is rather strange because it ignores the mapping
between environmental variables and internal states, a main feature of our model
that is widely used in the behavioural and evolutionary literature (e.g.,March and
Simon, 1958; Nelson andWinter, 1982). Felin and Foss (2011) thereby assert the
importance of human agency by misrepresenting the common characterization
of causal arguments in this line of work.2
But asserting the importance of human agency does not give an excuse to
terminate the search for causal explanation, which is the essence of science.
We maintain that we are also required to explain the causes behind individual
capacities and intentions, and not regard these as somehow uncaused, or beyond
the reach of science.
In this area, the ambiguities in the position of Felin and Foss (2011) become
further apparent when they argue for ‘free will’ and some causal ‘wiggle
room’ or ‘Spielraum’. They use the term ‘indeterminacy’ – again without
adequate definition. Given these allusions, do they regard intentions as (partially)
1 From standard models of statistical learning, it is easy to see why repetition can be useful. When the
propagation of feedback is masked by noise, a decision maker can improve expectations about possible
consequences of an action if she increases the sample size of that action (Gittins, 1989; March, 1991).
2 For example, Felin and Foss (2011) ignore James March and Herbert Simon’s (1958) careful
discussion of internal states of human actors (including memory conditions).
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uncaused, thus beyond the reach of (any eventual) causal explanation? For them,
are (some portion of) intentions entirely caused or not?
Clearly we are getting into very deep philosophical water here. But it is
reasonable to ask for some clarifications regarding their position.
We take a view that is consistent with what we believe to be the majority
position among modern philosophers. We uphold that every phenomenon is
caused and that the primary goal of science is causal explanation (e.g., Bunge,
1959). We also take a position known as compatibilism, which upholds that a
notion of free will is compatible with the proposition that wills are themselves
caused (e.g., Frankfurt, 1999). A view that human agency is somehow uncaused
would create a no-go area for science and create an untenable dualism or
mysticism. It would be inconsistent with the fact of human evolution from earlier
species and ultimately from inorganic matter. We also note that terms such as
determinism and indeterminacy are highly ambiguous and are used in several
different and conflicting ways (Bunge, 1959; Hodgson, 2004). Again we would
be interested in the more precise views of Felin and Foss.
Having made our own marks in the sand – albeit sketchily – it is reasonable
to ask for clarification on all the above points. Does the ‘poverty of stimulus’
argument imply that internal states are ultimate causes of human behaviour?
Is the ‘poverty of stimulus’ argument intended to lead to a notion of human
agency as an uncaused cause? For our part, we fully accept that each individual
is unique and that variation between individuals renders inadequate any causal
explanation based on stimulus or context alone. Indeed, that stance is essential
to the Darwinian approach that we have developed elsewhere (Hodgson and
Knudsen, 2010).
Felin and Foss present some positions as being in opposition, when they are
logically compatible. They are frequently unclear in their use of terminology,
and they confuse claims of partial and complete determination. Further debate
will be enhanced by some clear answers.
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